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INTRODUCTION

Lawyers already in practice at one law firm often move to
another law firm. This type of move is referred to as "lateraling." A
lawyer might choose to lateral for many of the reasons we often think
people in general take new positions: better job security, better pay,
better benefits, greater prestige, more interesting work, better future
job prospects, more leisure time, and/or more predictable hours.'
In contrast to lawyers in private practice, we do not commonly
associate judges with lateraling. But the fact is that, just as some judges
are reassigned or promoted within a judicial system (for example, a
federal district judge being elevated to the court of appeals), some
judges occasionally engage in a practice to which we logically might
refer as "judicial lateraling": they move from being a judge in one

*
Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. I benefited from
participation in conferences at the Emory University School of Law and the Vanderbilt Law School.
I received valuable feedback from Yonathan Arbel, Christina Boyd, Tracey George, Gbemende
Johnson, Michael Kang, Daniel Klerman, Clarisa Long, Jacob Nussim, Joanna Shepherd, and
Albert Yoon, and from participants in presentations at the Vanderbilt Law Review Symposium,
the American Law and Economics 2017 annual meeting at Yale Law School, and the Society for
Institutional and Organizational Economics 2017 annual meeting at Columbia University.

1.

See, e.g., NALP FOUND. FOR RESEARCH & EDUC., THE LATERAL LAWYER: WHY THEY LEAVE

AND WHAT MAY MAKE THEM STAY 21-29 (2001) (summarizing factors that have most commonly
been reported to be of particular importance in law firm associates' decisions to make job changes).
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judicial system to being a judge in another. Since judges are usually
(inexorably) tied to a particular jurisdiction, 2 the reality is that a
judicial lateral will move either from a state judiciary to the federal
judiciary, or from the federal judiciary to a state judiciary. For example,
William J. Brennan, Jr. was serving as an associate justice on the
Supreme Court of New Jersey when President Dwight D. Eisenhower
appointed him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States. As another example, Joseph Lamb Bodine was appointed
as a United States district judge on the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey by President T. Woodrow Wilson in 1920; he
served in that capacity until he resigned in 1929 to take a position as
an associate justice on the Supreme Court of New Jersey.3
Just as judges lateral much like lawyers in private practice, we
might expect that judges lateral for the same reasons. Indeed, as Judge
Richard Posner has argued, judges value the same things everyone else
does.4
The prevailing wisdom is that judges will lateral (if they have
the opportunity) from a state judicial system to the federal judiciary.5
And, indeed, several factors bolster this view. Federal judges enjoy
great job security (life tenure6 ), pay that generally exceeds the pay of
state judges, assurance that their compensation will not be reduced,'

2.
On rare occasions, the president has appointed an individual working in the judiciary of
one state's jurisdiction to a position in the federal judiciary that lies outside the original state. By
far, the most common example of this phenomenon is where the president appoints a state judge
to the federal judiciary in the District of Columbia. By contrast, because the federal judicial system
spans all U.S. state and territorial jurisdictions, a judge can be promoted within the federal judicial
system and in so doing move from a "jurisdiction" in one part of the country to one in another. For
example, Karen LeCraft Henderson was appointed to the federal district court in South Carolina
by President Ronald Reagan, and was subsequently appointed by President George H.W. Bush to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Karen LeCraft Henderson,
U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR D.C. CIR., https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/content/VL+-

+Judges+-+KLH (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/64P5-T279].
3.

Joseph

Lamb

Bodine,
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FOR
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N.J.,

http://www.history.njd.uscourts.gov/judges/district bios/JosephLambBodine (last visited Oct. 5,
2017) [https://perma.cc[MG7K-VVJK].
4.
See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 4 (1993) (presenting an economic theory of the
behavior of judges premised on the notion that they are analogous to ordinary people).
5.
See, e.g., Kathleen A. Bratton & Rorie L. Spill, Moving Up the Judicial Ladder: The
Nomination of State Supreme Court Justices to the Federal Courts, 32 AM. POL. RES. 198, 199
(2004) (identifying the factors that influence the nomination of state supreme court justices to the
federal courts).
6.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour. . . ."). This assumes that the judge's position within the
federal system is an Article III judgeship.
7.
See id. (guaranteeing to federal judges "a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office").

2017]

JUDICIAL LATERALS

1913

and attractive retirement benefits.8 Moreover, the federal judicial
system is generally seen as more prestigious-along a variety of
metrics9-than the various state judiciaries.
At the same time, there are reasons that one might expect at
least some federal judges to be attracted to at least some positions in a
state judiciary. First, the judicial system in which a judge works is only
one measure of the hierarchical prestige she is thought to enjoy. In
addition to their relative hierarchical positions-what we might call
"intersystemic hierarchical positions"-judicial systems have their own
internal hierarchies. These internal hierarchies resemble one another
closely, with trial courts in the bottom tier, high courts in the top tier,
and (for most jurisdictions today) intermediate appellate courts in the
middle. Within this hierarchical structure that transcends judicial
systems-what we might call "transsystemic hierarchy"-higher
positions in the hierarchy are thought to be more prestigious than are
lower positions. Thus, a federal district judge seeking greater prestige
might be open to pursuing a position on a state appellate court or,
perhaps especially, the state's high court.
Moreover, increased prestige in terms of transsystemic
hierarchical position is not the only feature that might make such a
lateral move potentially attractive. The appellate court positions that
generally lie higher on the transsystemic judicial hierarchy offer not
only prestige but also (at least for some) the promise of more interesting
work, more predictable hours, and even more leisure time.10
On this logic, while we should generally expect to see far more
laterals from the state judiciaries to the federal judiciary, we might
expect to see a few jurists-like Justice Bodine-move from low levels
of the federal judicial hierarchy to higher levels of the state judiciaries.

8.
Federal judges are entitled to retire and continue to receive their full salaries provided
that they meet governing statutory requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2012). As Albert Yoon
explains:
The current standard is what is commonly referred to as the "Rule of 80," which
requires that the retiring judge be at least sixty-five years of age, with age and total
years of service on the bench totaling at least eighty years. 28 U.S.C. § 371(c) (2002).
Prior to 1985, judges were required to be at least sixty-five years of age and to have
served on the bench fifteen years. Prior to 1954, judges were required to serve on the
bench until they were at least seventy years old, with ten years of service. 28 U.S.C.
§ 371(b) (1952).
Albert Yoon, Love's Labor's Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 1945-2000, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 1029, 1056 n.86 (2003).
9.
See infra text accompanying notes 15-23.
10. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, JudicialBehaviorand Performance:An Economic Approach,
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1265 (2005) ("[T]he salary and prestige differences between district
and circuit judges are small, though the workload is lighter in the appellate court.").
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Moreover, all state judiciaries are not the same. Commentators
have compiled evidence confirming that some state judiciaries are more
"professional" than others'"-indeed, a select few are, on some
measures, more professional than the federal judiciary. 12 This suggests
that we might observe different lateral patterns for different
jurisdictions. In particular, for some state jurisdictions that feature (or
at least are perceived to enjoy) low levels of professionalism, the
relevant hierarchy might place the entire federal judiciary above the
entire state judiciary (with the levels of each judicial system arranged
hierarchically, i.e., with the high court above the intermediate court of
appeals, and both above the trial court). But, for other state
jurisdictions that feature higher levels of professionalism, one can
imagine a more complex interlocking hierarchy where the state's
appellate courts (or at least its high court) lie between the federal
district court and the federal court of appeals. Beyond professionalism,
the standard judicial term in office and the salaries the state pays its
judges also may determine whether an interlocking hierarchy inheres.
In this Article, I undertake to examine these questions
empirically. I rely upon a novel database of movements by judges from
a state judiciary to the federal judiciary, or from the federal judiciary to
a state judiciary.
In Part I, I provide a general overview of the judicial labor
market. In Part II, I generate expectations, and then testable
hypotheses, about judicial lateral moves into, and out of, the federal
judiciary. In Part III, I test those hypotheses, generally finding support
for all of them. Part IV discusses the empirical results.
I. JUDICIAL LABOR MARKETS AND LATERALING
It is well accepted among scholars from various disciplines that
judges function within a labor market. The judicial labor market is, in
some sense, a subset of the broader market for attorneys. Indeed,
studies suggest that attorneys (to some degree at least) compare the
features of working as an attorney with those of working as a judge
when deciding whether to pursue (or continue in) judicial positions. 13

11. I rely below upon Professor Peverill Squire's professionalism measure for state high
courts, which bases professionalism on state high court salary, the extent to which the state high
court enjoys discretion over its docket, and the extent of the state high court's staff. See Peverill
Squire, Measuring the Professionalizationof U.S. State Courts of Last Resort, 8 ST. POL. & POL'Y
Q. 223, 228 (2008).
12. See id. at 229.
13. See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Eric Helland, How Much Should Judges Be Paid?An
Empirical Study of the Effect of Judicial Pay on the State Bench, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1277, 1319
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It is also true, however, that the judicial labor market is a
market unto itself. 14 To be sure, it has its idiosyncrasies. Unlike most
jobs, some judges enjoy life tenure once they ascend to the bench. Also,
U.S. judges do not enjoy the promise, or even the freedom, to move "up
in rank" as do participants in many labor markets. Finally, the judicial
labor market is not nationwide; instead it is largely limited to the state
in which the judge currently sits.
Still, the judicial labor market is worthy of study. Many
attorneys remain judges for the bulk of their careers and it is the final
legal job for many (only in part because of the life tenure enjoyed by
some judges). 15 And, as my dataset demonstrates, the market for
judicial laterals is an active one: out of 3,580 federal judges in the
Federal Judicial Center's biographical collection of all Article III judges,
I found 925 instances of a judge moving (directly) from a state judiciary
to the federal judiciary or from the federal judiciary to a state
judiciary. 16 In other words, judicial lateraling is not an uncommon
phenomenon. And, with the growth in the size of the federal judiciary,
it has, if anything, become more common.
II. EXPECTATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

In this Part, I develop expectations, and then hypotheses, about
the movement of judges from state judiciaries to the federal judicial
system, and from the federal judiciary to the various state judiciaries.
Conceptualizing the judiciaries as employers and judges as employees,
the question becomes how we should consider the incentives present in
the judicial labor market. Consistent with what others have said, I
assume that judges want what employees typically want: some
combination of (1) prestige, (2) the opportunity to work in a setting that
recognizes and values professionalism, (3) substantial pay, (4) job
security, and (5) expanded leisure time and/or more control over their
schedules.
In order to develop expectations for why judges might choose to
lateral (or choose not to lateral) between judicial systems, I construct
hierarchies between state and federal judiciaries, and between

(2012) (finding that increases in judicial salary increase the likelihood that those with private
sector legal experience will join the bench).
14.

See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND

EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 25 (2013) (discussing judges' participation in a labor
market); Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of JudicialBehavior, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2017, 2041 (2016) (describing the judge as being a participant in the judicial labor market).
15. See Bratton & Spill, supranote 5, at 198-99.
16. See infra text accompanying note 35.
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positions in those judiciaries, that judges reasonably might perceive. As
we shall see presently, judges who value different factors may perceive
the hierarchies differently.
Let us begin with the uncontroversial proposition that most U.S.
judiciaries share a common internal hierarchical structure: there are
trial courts, intermediate appellate courts, and the jurisdiction's high
court. (A few U.S. jurisdictions lack intermediate appellate courts;1 7 the
internal hierarchy is otherwise the same.) The trial courts lie at the
bottom of the hierarchy, and the high court at the top. To see why,
consider first that cases generally enter the system through the trial
courts; appellate courts have the power to review the decisions of trial
courts, and the high court has the final say even over the intermediate
appellate courts.
Consider next the relative attributes (in any judicial system) of
working as a trial judge as opposed to an appellate judge (including as
a high court judge). Trial judges are seen to be at the bottom of each
judiciary's hierarchy. In addition, trial judges' schedules are generally
less predictable as a result of having to deal with discovery disputes,
trials, and settlement conferences. By contrast, appellate judges
generally have more predictable schedules, with case hearings set far
in advance and with far less contact with attorneys. Finally, appellate
judges are generally paid more than trial judges, with high court judges
generally paid more than intermediate appellate court judges. This
suggests that, all else equal,18 judges should prefer to move higher in
the hierarchy within a single judiciary-thatis, a trial judge should
prefer to be an intermediate appellate court judge or (even better) a
state high court judge, while an intermediate appellate court judge
should aspire to be a state high court judge.
The transsystemic judicial hierarchy-thatreflects the typical
U.S. judicial system, with trial courts on the bottom and the high court
on the top-is depicted in Figure 1.

17. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Opting for Change or Continuity? Thinking About
'Reforming'the JudicialArticle of Montana'sConstitution, 72 MONT. L. REV. 27, 35 (2011) ("Thirtynine states have such [intermediate] courts; the remainder do not.").
18. An individual may prefer being a trial court judge, the benefits of working as an appellate
judge notwithstanding.
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FIGURE 1: THE TRANSSYSTEMIC JUDICIAL HIERARCHY

High court

Intermediate
appellate courts

Trial courts

Let us next consider the hierarchical relationship between the
federal judiciary on the one hand, and the various state judiciaries on
the other. To be sure, many have noted that as a general matter-and
even in most side-by-side comparisons-the federal judiciary fares well
as compared to state judiciaries on several metrics. On the question of
job security, federal judges enjoy life tenure while most state judges do
not. The federal judicial system is generally seen as more prestigious
than its state counterparts. Federal judges hear some cases that state
ven
courts cannot, including habeas cases where the federal courts
the lower federal courts-sit in judgment of state court criminal
decisions. 19 Moreover, while state courts hear cases that federal courts
do not, there is a sense that those are less interesting or important. And,
to the extent that state and federal courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction
over most cases, 20 there is a sense that the federal courts-whether

19.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012):

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
20. See, e.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962) ("Concurrent
jurisdiction has been a common phenomenon in our judicial history, and exclusive federal court
jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law has been the exception rather than the rule.").
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because of the actions of litigantS 2 1 or the federal courts themselveS 22
wind up with the share of those cases that includes more interesting
issueS 23 (and even if that is not in fact the case, the perception may
nevertheless

persist 2 4 ).

In addition, federal courts enjoy a power

advantage over the state courts: their judicial power exceeds that of
state courts, 25 and, indeed, federal courts can exert power over state
courts in a way that state courts cannot exert power over their federal
counterparts. 26 Moreover, the perceptions of judges and the broader
legal community likely match (if not exceed) the reality. 27 Finally,
federal courts are generally thought to receive greater funding and to
offer more of a professional setting in which to work. 28 For all these
reasons, we might conceive of the federal courts as hierarchically
superior-and therefore more attractive to judges-than the various
21. For example, plaintiffs in diversity and federal question cases have the freedom to file
suit in federal district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (2012). At the same time, if a plaintiff in one
of those cases chooses instead to file suit in state court, the defendant has the freedom to remove
the case to federal court (unless the suit is a diversity case that is brought in the defendant's home
state). Id. § 1441. And "[t]he empirical evidence relating to forum choice ...
indicates that
attorneys perceive a competence gap between the state and federal courts and that this gap plays
a prominent role in filing decisions." Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise:Rethinking
the Justificationsfor Federal Question Jurisdiction,97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 148 (2009); see Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115-30 (1977) (detailing practical reasons
that might likely induce federal constitutional plaintiffs to prefer a federal trial forum to a state
trial forum).
22. For example, abstention doctrines and certification afford federal courts the discretion to
retain certain cases (or portions of cases) or to afford the state courts adjudicatory authority. See
generally Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for TransjurisdictionalAdjudication, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1869, 1875-77 (2008) (describing the devices by which federal courts can obtain feedback
from the state court system as to the appropriate resolution of state law issues).
23. See, e.g., Justin R. Long, Against Certification,78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 127-131 (2009)
(arguing that federal courts use certification procedure as an opportunity to send less important,
tedious questions of state law to state courts for resolution, opting to retain the more interesting
questions for themselves).
24. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to
Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 531 (2012) ("State courts may perceive an
imprecise jurisdictional boundary as enabling federal courts to 'cherry-pick' more interesting and
momentous cases.").
25. See generally Nash, supra note 22, at 1904 ("[A]Ill state courts are directly inferior to a
part of the federal court system: the United States Supreme Court[,]" while "the federal courts
only need to apply state law by virtue of the Court's decision in Erie, and then only when Congress
has seen fit to extend jurisdiction over questions of state law." (footnote omitted)).
26. See id. at 1905 ("[Flederal courts may stay actions in state court under appropriate
circumstances, but state courts may not as a general matter stay actions in federal court," (footnote
omitted)).
27. The perception may be that the power disparity is gendered. See Judith Resnik,
"Naturally"Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction,and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682,
1693 (1991) (describing "a perception that the world of the federal courts is populated by and is
about men").
28. See Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 148 (noting that federal judges generally enjoy a resource
advantage over state court judges with regard to clerks, support staff, information management,
and physical facilities).

20171

JUDICIAL LATERALS

state judiciaries. This intersystemic hierarchical
reflected in Figure 2.

1919
relationship

is

FIGURE 2: THE INTERSYSTEMIC JUDICIAL HIERARCHY

Federal judiciary

State

judiciaries

How might we combine the transsystemic hierarchy in Figure 1
with the intersystemic hierarchy in Figure 2 to produce a unified
hierarchy that reflects the relative hierarchical positions of the various
courts in the federal and state judiciaries? One possibility is that
Figure 2's intersystemic hierarchy is dominant, such that federal courts
of all levels lie higher in the hierarchy than all state courts. This is
reflected in Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3: HIERARCHICAL RELATIONSHIP THAT PLACES THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY ABOVE THE STATE JUDICIARY

U.S. Supreme
Court

U.S. Courts of
Appeals

State High
Court

U.S. District
Courts

State Intermediate Appellate
Courts

State Trial
Courts

There is another, more nuanced way that one might combine
Figure 1's transsystemic hierarchy with Figure 2's intersystemic
hierarchy. Such a hierarchical relationship allows for overlap between
the federal judiciary and state judiciaries, even if the U.S. Supreme
Court remains at the top of the hierarchy and state trial courts at the
bottom. To see the logic behind such a unified hierarchy, we must not
only factor in the hierarchy of the judiciary within which the judge now
sits, but also the extent to which the judge might offset (1) the
intersystemic hierarchical advantage of one judicial system over
another against (2) the transsystemic hierarchical advantage of a better
judicial position (notwithstanding the judicial system in which the
position lies). To be more concrete, a judge reasonably might prefer a
position as an appellate court judge in a state judiciary to a position as
a federal trial judge. This hierarchical arrangement appears in Figure
4.
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FIGURE 4: HIERARCHICAL RELATIONSHIP THAT FEATURES OVERLAP
BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE JUDICIARIES
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State High
Court

State Intermediate Appellate
Courts

Appeals

U.S. District
Courts

State Trial
Courts

The two different unified hierarchies reflected in Figures 3 and
4 give rise to different expectations, and in turn hypotheses, about
judicial laterals. On the basis of the hierarchy depicted in Figure 3, one
would expect that a judge working in a state judiciary would (all else
equal) prefer a position in the federal judiciary more frequently than a
federal judge would prefer a position in a state judicial system. This
translates to Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1: We should observe more judges moving from state
judiciariesto the federaljudiciary than from the federal judiciary
to state judiciaries.
We may reach a more nuanced expectation when we consider the
transsystemic hierarchy of judicial positions and factor in the relative
professionalism of the various judiciaries. On the logic of the
hierarchical structure depicted in Figure 4, we might expect that a
federal judge might be willing to accept a move to a state judiciary that
offsets the relative detriments of the transfer to the state judiciary with
a move up the transsystemic hierarchy of judicial positions-what I
refer to as a "step-up" in the transsystemic judicial hierarchy. In
contrast, a "step-down" in the transsystemic judicial hierarchy occurs
when a judge moves down the transsystemic hierarchy of judicial
positions. For example, a federal trial judge might be unwilling to
accept a position as a state trial judge, but open to accepting a position
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as a state appellate-or high court-judge (which would constitute a
step-up). This point is embodied in Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: To the extent that we observe judges moving from
the federal judiciary to state judiciaries, we should rarely observe
those judges accepting a step-down in the transsystemic hierarchy
of judicialpositions, and insteadshould more often observe judges
gaining a step-up in the transsystemic hierarchy of judicial
positions.
In addition, one might conclude that a lateral move involving a
step-up in judicial position is more likely to be observed when the lateral
move is out of the federal judiciary rather than into it. This is not
because a judge would be averse to a step-up in judicial position
combined with a move from a state judiciary to a federal judicial
position; to the contrary, one would generally expect a state judge to
welcome such a lateral move. Rather, insofar as (consistent with Figure
3) state judges would welcome a move to the federal judiciary, the
president would have his pick of state judges to fill a federal judicial
position. Given that, the president ought to be able to find a judge who
would experience a step-down in the hierarchy of judicial positions-or
at least who would remain at the same level-to fill the open federal
judicial position. In contrast, consistent with Figure 4, a state might
need to offer a step-up in judicial position in order to entice a judge to
surrender a federal judicial position. Thus, steps-up in judicial position
should be more likely when a judge moves out of, rather than into, the
federal judicial system. This is reflected in Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: A lateral move involving a step-up in judicial
position is more likely to be observed when the lateral move is out
of the federal judiciary rather than into it.
A separate reason that a judge might perceive the relevant
hierarchy as presented in Figure 4, as opposed to Figure 3, is that some
state judiciaries are perceived to be more professional than others. 29
Indeed, the work of Professor Peverill Squire suggests that a couple of
elite state judiciaries are perceived to be more professional than the

29. See Burton M. Atkins & Henry R. Glick, Environmental and Structural Variables as
Determinantsof Issues in State Courts of Last Resort, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI. 97, 103 (1976) (comparing
state courts according to variables including perceived professionalism); Paul Brace & Melinda
Gann Hall, "Haves" Versus "Have Nots" in State Supreme Courts: Allocating Docket Space and
Wins in Power Asymmetric Cases, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 393, 402-03 (2001) (finding that
professionalism varies among state courts); Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State
Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83, 98 (1983) (describing the vast range of judicial professionalism
in state courts); Squire, supra note 11, at 228 (ranking state courts by professionalism); see also
DANIEL BERKOWITZ & KAREN B. CLAY, THE EVOLUTION OF A NATION: How GEOGRAPHY AND LAW

SHAPED THE AMERICAN STATES 169-89 (2012) (presenting empirical evidence that legislatures in
states with civil law origins that predate statehood fund their state judiciaries at lower rates).

2017]

JUDICIAL LATERALS

1923

federal judiciary. 30 Thus, for some state judiciaries, the hierarchy
presented in Figure 4 might be more plausible than the hierarchy
presented in Figure 3.
On this logic, one might conclude that the higher the state
judiciary is perceived to fare on professionalism, the less likely it will be
for a state judge to accept a move to a less prestigious judicial positioni.e., a step-down in the transsystemic hierarchy of judicial positionsin the federal judiciary. 3 1 One also might expect that the higher the
state judiciary is perceived to fare on professionalism, the more likely it
will be for a federal judge to accept a move to a state judiciary. These
points are reflected in Hypotheses 4 and 5.
Hypothesis 4: The greater the professionalism of a state
judiciary, the less likely it should be for a state judge to accept a
step-down in the transsystemic hierarchy of judicial positions
when moving from that judiciary to the federal judiciary.
Hypothesis 5: The greater the professionalism of a state
judiciary, the more likely it should befor a federal judge to accept
a move from the federal judiciary to that state'sjudiciary.
Next, one might believe that the frequency with which a state
court judge faces the prospect of seeking reelection or reappointment
might affect that judge's willingness to accept a step-down in the
transsystemic hierarchy of judicial positions in moving to a federal
judicial position. This is reflected in Hypothesis 6.
Hypothesis 6: The longer the length of term in office enjoyed by
judges in the state, the less likely it should be for a state judge to
accept a step -down in the transsystemic hierarchy of judicial
positions when moving from the state judiciary to the federal
judiciary.
Finally, one might expect that salary is especially important to
a judge's decision to make a lateral move. 32 In particular, one might
think that a judge would be reluctant to accept salary reductions in
connection with a concomitant reduction in either the judge's level in

30. See Squire, supra note 11, at 229.
31. Bratton & Spill, supranote 5, at 204 (State supreme court "[j]ustices who have achieved
a high level of seniority or who serve on prestigious courts may not have much incentive to pursue
federal judicial service.").
32. See, e.g., Jenna Greene, From Baker Botts to the Bench and Back: When Being a Judge
Isn't
the
Ultimate
Job,
AMLAW
LITIG.
DAiLY
(June
19,
2017),
http://www.litigationdaily.comlid=1202790408430/From-Baker-Botts-to-the-Bench-and-BackWhen-Being-a-Judge-Isnt-the-Ultimate-Job?slreturn=20170730131418
[https://perma.cc/9KRRGSLB] (noting that being a judge is demanding public service work for a salary similar to a big
law associate). The measure for professionalism of a state's judiciary that I employ takes into
account the salary of judges on the state's high court. A judge on a lower state court (or
contemplating a move to a lower state court) might be swayed instead by the compensation his or
her current position (or the position he or she is contemplating taking) offers.
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the transsystemic judicial hierarchy-i.e., if the judge receives a stepdown-or the judge's judicial system on the intersystemic judicial
hierarchy-i.e., if the judge moves from the federal judiciary to a state
judicial system. This idea is reflected in Hypotheses 7 and 8.
Hypothesis 7: Only rarely will a judge accept a step-down in
moving from a state judiciary to the federal judiciary without a
salary increase.
Hypothesis 8: Only rarely will a judge agree to move from the
federaljudiciary to a position in a statejudiciary without a salary
increase.
I test these eight hypotheses in the next Part.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this Part, I present my empirical analysis. In Section A, I
explicate the content of my dataset and methodology. In Section B, I
explain the extent to which the eight hypotheses I introduced in Part II
are validated by the data.
A. The Dataset
The unit of analysis was lateral moves by judges either into or
out of the federal judicial system. I started with data from the
"Biographical Directory of Federal Judges" on the Federal Judicial
Center ("FJC") website, and searched for judges whose "Professional
Experience" information included time spent as a "judge" or
"chancellor" on a "court." This yielded a set of 2,065 judges (out of 3,580
in the entire FJC database). I then read through the biographies of
those 2,065 judges and eliminated (1) judges who never a worked as a
state judge before or after their federal judicial service, 33 and (2) federal
judges whose work in a state judiciary did not immediately predate or
postdate their federal judicial work. 34
This left a set of 925 instances where a federal judge worked in
a state judiciary either immediately before, or immediately after, his or
her federal judicial service. 35 For each judge who moved from a state
judiciary to the federal judiciary, I coded the judge's name, the year the

33. The FJC database included within the employment field a judge's previous failed
nominations to federal courts. See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789Present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/L24X-UYWU]. My search included such judges within its ambit.
34. Where the FJC database was unclear whether there was a gap between one judgeship
and another, I consulted other sources.
35. In very few cases, a judge moved both ways, and thus appears in the database twice.
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judge switched judicial systems, the judge's age at the time of that
switch, the state judicial system in which the judge worked, the last
position held by the judge in that state judicial system, and the first
position held by the judge in the federal judiciary. I then translated the
level of the judge's last position in the state judiciary and the level of
the judge's first position in the federal judiciary (using a "0" for trial
court level, 36 "1" for intermediate appellate court level, 37 and "2" for high
court level 38). By subtracting the level of the earlier (state) judicial
position from the level of the later (federal) judicial position, I arrived
at the "change in hierarchical judicial position"-or "step"-represented
by the switch. (For example, a judge who switched from being a state
supreme court justice to being a federal trial judge had a step of 0 - 2 =
-2.) Steps ranged from -2 to +2, with a step of "0" indicating no change
in the hierarchical level of judicial position after the lateral move.
I coded switches of judges from the federal judiciary to a state
judiciary similarly, except that I coded the last position held by the
judge in the federal judiciary and the first position held by the judge in
the state judiciary. Again, the step was calculated by subtracting the
level of the earlier (federal) judicial position from the level of the later
(state) judicial position.
Table 1 summarizes the meaning of the various values for the
"step" variable.

36. I coded a state court as a "1" regardless of its moniker or relative status. Thus, I coded as
"1" both probate courts and state trial courts of general jurisdiction.
37. I coded the old federal circuit courts as "1" even though they exercised original as well as
appellate jurisdiction.
38. I coded a high court as "2" even if (as was generally the case through the nineteenth
century, and remained the case for a few jurisdictions into the twentieth century) a jurisdiction
had no intermediate appellate judicial tier.
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TABLE 1: MEANINGS OF THE VARIOUS VALUES FOR THE "STEP"
VARIABLE
Value of "Step"
Variable
-2
-1

Meaning
Judge moved from being a supreme court justice in one
system to a trial judge in the other system.
Judge moved from being a supreme court justice in one
system to an intermediate appellate judge in the other

O
+1

+2

system; or from being an intermediate appellate judge
in one system to a trial judge in the other system.
Judge's move between judicial systems did not affect
the level of the court on which the judge serves.
Judge moved from being a trial judge in one system to
an intermediate appellate judge in the other system, or
from being an intermediate appellate judge in one
system to a supreme court justice in the other system.
Judge moved from being a trial judge in one system to
a supreme court

justice

in the other system.

Finally, throughout the dataset, I entered a "professionalism"
score for the state judicial system for which the judge worked (whether
before or after the lateral move). I used the scores developed by
Professor Squire based upon state high court salary, the extent to which
the state high court enjoys discretion over its docket, and the extent of
the state high court's staff.39 I also coded each judge's salary, before and
after the lateral move. 40
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the dataset.

39. Squire offers four measures of state high court professionalism. They correlate at high
levels. See Squire, supranote 11, at 228. To the extent I relied upon state court professionalism in
the analysis below, I ran regressions using all four of the measures; the results were similar to
what I report.
40. For jurisdictions where the salary changed during the year of the lateral move, I coded
the new, higher salary. Also, for some judicial positions in some jurisdictions, the state provided
part of the judge's salary, with local government augmenting the salary; I coded the entire salary
that the judge would receive.
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE DATASET

Lateral
moves from
a state
judiciary to
the federal
judiciary
Lateral
moves from
the federal
judiciary to
a state
judicia ry
TOTAL

-2
83

-1
126

STEP
0
662

+1
32

+2
8

911

0

0

2

5

7

14

664

37

5
15

925

83

1 26_1
126

TOTAL

B. Testing the Hypotheses
According to Hypothesis 1, we should observe more judges
moving from state judiciaries to the federal judiciary than from the
federal judiciary to the state judiciaries. This conclusion is manifestly
and unquestionably supported by the data, with 911 (98.5%) of the 925
lateral moves in the dataset constituting moves from a state judiciary
to the federal judiciary. 41
According to Hypothesis 2, to the extent that we observe judges
moving from the federal judiciary to state judiciaries, we should observe
those judges rarely accepting a step-down and more often gaining a
step-up in the hierarchy of judicial positions. While we do not have
enough examples of lateral moves out of the federal judiciary for
meaningful statistical analysis, the data we do have clearly conform to
this hypothesis: of the fourteen lateral moves out of the federal
judiciary, none constituted a step-down, and twelve constituted a stepup.
According to Hypothesis 3, a lateral move involving a step-up in
judicial position is more likely to be observed when the lateral move is
out of the federal judiciary rather than into it. Table 3 presents a cross
tabulation of whether a lateral move was state-to-federal and whether
a lateral move constituted a step-up in judicial position. Approximately
5.62% of the 925 lateral moves in the dataset constituted steps-up in
judicial position. Thus, in the absence of a relationship between the

41.

This is statistically significant under a binomial test at the 1% level.
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direction of the lateral move and whether the lateral move constituted
a step-up, one would expect to see steps-up approximately 5.62% of the
time, regardless of the direction of the lateral move. In fact, for lateral
moves out of the federal judiciary, there were steps-up approximately
85.71% of the time; for lateral moves into the federal judiciary, there
were steps-up approximately 4.39% of the time. Not surprisingly, the
difference between the observed and expected values is statistically
significant at the 1% level (p = 0.000) according to a Fisher's exact test
with one degree of freedom. The data indicate that a lateral move out of
the federal judiciary was in excess of 130 times more likely to result in
a step-up in judicial position than was a lateral move into the federal
judiciary. 42
TABLE 3: CORRELATION BETWEEN WHETHER A LATERAL MOVE WAS
STATE TO FEDERAL, AND WHETHER A LATERAL MOVE CONSTITUTED A
STEP-UP IN JUDICIAL POSITION
Whether the lateral move constituted a stepup in judicialposition.

Whether the
lateral move
was from a state
judiciary to the

federal

Yes

No

Yes

Total

2
(14.29)

12
(85.71)

14
(100.00)

871
(95.61)

40
(4.39)

911
(100.00)

873
(94.38)

52
(5.62)

925
(100.00)

judiciary.
Total

NOTE: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a Fisher's exact
test is 0.000***.
KEY: * represents significance at the 10% level, ** represents significance at the 5%
level, and *** represents significance at the 1% level.

According to Hypothesis 4, the greater the professionalism of a
state judiciary, the less likely it should be for a state judge to accept a
step-down in the transsystemic hierarchy of judicial positions when
42. We can compare the chance of a partial reversal where the district court denied summary
judgment with that where the district court granted summary judgment by dividing the odds of
such a vote for summary judgment denials (.857/.143) by the odds of such a vote for summary
judgment grants (.044/.956). The odds ratio (5.993/.046) indicates that a court of appeals panel is
130.28 times more likely to partially reverse a summary judgment denial than a summary
judgment grant.
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moving from that judiciary to the federal judiciary. I tested this
hypothesis by running a logistic regression. The dependent variable
was whether the lateral move involved the judge accepting a step-down
in the transsystemic hierarchy of judicial positions. The key
independent variable was the state judiciary's professionalism score,
which I operationalized as Professor Squire's measure of state high
court professionalism. 43 Since others have found a judge's age to be a
predictor of judicial lateral moves, 44 I included the judge's age at the
time of the lateral move as a control variable. Finally, since the
professionalism scores apply only to states and were generated based
on recent data, I excluded lateral moves (1) made from the judicial
systems in Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, and (2) made in
1980 or before. This left a dataset of 440 lateral moves.
Table 4 reports the results of the logistic regression. Both
independent variables-the state high court's professionalism score and
the judge's age-have a statistically significant relationship with
whether a lateral move to the federal judiciary constituted a step-down
in judicial position. The older the judge, the more likely the judge was
to accept a step-down.
TABLE 4: LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF WHETHER A LATERAL MOVE (AFTER
1980) FROM A STATE JUDICIARY TO A FEDERAL JUDICIARY
CONSTITUTED A STEP-DOWN
Variable
State high court
professionalism

Coefficient

Odds

Standard

p-Value

-3.7213

Ratio
0.0242

Error
0.0165

0.000***

0.1060
-4.0663

1.1118
0.0171

0.0242
0.0198

0.000***
0.000***

score

Age of judge
Constant

N= 440. Log likelihood = -207.421. Pseudo-R 2 = 0.111.

* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Consistent with Hypothesis 4, the higher the state high court's
professionalism score, the less likely was a lateral move to constitute a
step-down. The odds ratio indicates essentially that, holding age
constant, as the state judiciary that the judge lateraled from shifts from
the lowest ranked to the highest ranked in terms of professionalism, the
odds of the lateral move constituting a step-down in position were 0.024
times lower (with a 95% confidence interval of [0.006, 0.093]). Put
another way, holding the other variables constant, having a lateral
43.
44.

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See Bratton & Spill, supra note 5, at 212-13.
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depart a very professional state judiciary decreased the odds of the
lateral move constituting a step-down by nearly 98%.
According to Hypothesis 5, the greater the professionalism of a
state judiciary, the more likely it should be for a federal judge to accept
a move from the federal judiciary to that state's judiciary. Once again,
we have very few examples of lateral moves out of the federal judiciary:
there are fourteen in total, only seven of which occurred after 1980 (the
time period during which we might have some confidence that the state
high court professionalism scores are meaningful). 45 Of those seven
lateral moves, five (a whopping 71.4%) were lateral moves to the
California state judiciary, and a sixth was to the Michigan state
judiciary; California and Michigan are both near the very top of the
46
professionalism score measure.
Hypothesis 6 posits that the longer the term in office enjoyed by
judges in the state, the less likely it should be for a state judge to accept
a step-down in the transsystemic hierarchy of judicial positions when
moving from that judiciary to the federal judiciary. To test this
hypothesis, I coded the length of the typical term in office enjoyed by
justices on each state's supreme court. While some state appellate court
judges might enjoy terms in office of a different length from state
supreme court justices, I chose to rely on supreme court justice terms
on the logic that state appellate court judges might aspire both to
elevation to the state high court and to a federal judicial position. And,
for the few states where judges enjoy lifetime appointments,4 7 I coded
the term length as twenty-five years.4 8 Finally, as above, I restricted
the analysis to lateral moves occurring in 1981 or later.

45. The lateral moves out of the federal judiciary occurred in 1791, 1806, 1813, 1824, 1929,
1936, 1944, 1983, 1984, 2001, 2006, 2008, and 2014.
46. California is ranked first along three of Squire's professionalism measures, and second
under the fourth; its professionalism ranks ahead of the federal judiciary's professionalism along
three of the four measures. Michigan ranks third on three of Squire's measures, and second on the
fourth. See Squire, supra note 11, at 228-29. The only other judge who lateraled from the federal
judiciary to a state judiciary after 1980 is a federal district judge who lateraled back to the same
Illinois circuit (trial) court where he had begun his judicial career. He had previously been elevated
to the Illinois Appellate Court, whence he had lateraled to the federal judiciary years earlier. See
infra note 49 and accompanying text.
47. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The PartisanPrice of Justice:An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributionsand Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 79 n.44 (2011)
('Judges in Massachusetts and New Hampshire are appointed for permanent tenure to age
seventy, and Rhode Island grants its judges life tenure."). I also coded New Jersey as a "life tenure"
state. New Jersey governors appoint state supreme court justices (and New Jersey superior court
judges) to initial seven-year terms, and then can (but need not) reappoint sitting justices (and
judges) for tenures that last until mandatory retirement at age 70. See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6,
para. 3.
48. I chose 25 years to reflect the notion that a supreme court justice might likely be
appointed in his or her 40s and conceivably serve around 25 years until his or her retirement
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I ran a logistic regression of whether a judge accepted a stepdown against state high court professionalism score, state high court
term length, and judge's age. Table 5 reports the results of this
regression.
TABLE 5: LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF WHETHER A LATERAL MOVE (AFTER
1980) FROM A STATE JUDICIARY TO A FEDERAL JUDICIARY
CONSTITUTED A STEP-DOWN
Variable

Coefficient

State high court
professionalism
score
State high court
term length
Age of judge
Constant
N = 440. Log likelihood

Standard
Error
0.8035

p-Value

-3.8279

Odds
Ratio
0.0218

-0.0523

0.9491

0.0341

0.125

0.1079
-3.8405

1.1139
0.0215

0.0220
1.1715

0.000***
0.001***

= -206.534. Pseudo-1

2

0.000***

= 0.115. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Consistent with Hypothesis 6, the longer the state high court
term length, the less likely was a lateral move to constitute a step-down.
While the state high court term length variable is not statistically
significant, it does approach significance at the 10% level.
Hypotheses 7 and 8 considered the effect of salary on judicial
laterals. Hypothesis 7 posited that only rarely would a judge moving
from a state judiciary to the federal judiciary accept a step-down absent
a salary increase. Figure 5 presents a histogram of salary differentials
(in 2016 dollars) for the one hundred judges who accepted a step-down
in moving from a state judiciary (including the District of Columbia
local court system) to the federal judiciary after 1980. The mean salary
differential was an increase of $36,694. A few judges accepted salary
reductions (the largest reduction being $25,145). But by far the vast
majority-90.0%-received salary increases (the largest increase being
$104,961). These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 7.

(bearing in mind that only one "life tenure" state does not have a mandatory retirement age of 70,
see supra note 47). The longest non-life-tenure term for a high court judge is 14 years for a judge
on the New York Court of Appeals, N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(a); several state supreme courts feature
terms of 12 years, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(a).
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FIGURE 5: HISTOGRAM OF SALARY DIFFERENTIALS (IN 2016 DOLLARS)
AMONG JUDGES WHO LATERALED AFTER 1980 FROM A STATE JUDICIAL
POSITION TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND ACCEPTED A STEP-DOWN
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Hypothesis 8 set out the expectation that few judges would move
from the federal judiciary to a state judicial position absent a salary
increase. Out of the seven judges who made such a move after 1980, five
received salary increases (and also received steps-up). Of the two judges
who accepted salary reductions, one-Judge Patricia Boyle-also
received a step-up in the transsystemic judicial hierarchy-from a
position as a federal district judge in Michigan to a seat on the Michigan
Supreme Court. The other--Judge Michael McCuskey-did not enjoy a
step-up in position; rather, he returned to an Illinois trial court position
he had held before his appointment as an Illinois federal district
judge. 49 Overall, the data are consistent with Hypothesis 8.
49. See supranote 46 (noting the judge's lateral move back to the circuit court where he began
his career). Perhaps he enjoyed his state judicial service better, or geographical considerations
drove his decision. See Gary L. Smith, Michael McCuskey Retires from Federal Bench, Will Serve
as Marshall County Presiding Judge, J. STAR
(Jan. 4,
2015,
9:54
PM),
http://www.pjstar.com/article/20150104/News/150109742 [https://perma.cclX7WC-U38Z] ("After
chafing at the constraints of sentencing mandates and other aspects of the federal system,
McCuskey said that the grassroots-level judging in the rural counties is what he craves.").
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IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The results of the analysis in the prior Part provide statistically
significant support for Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4. There are not enough
data points to secure meaningful statistical analysis of Hypotheses 2, 5,
and 8. However, the limited data are certainly entirely consistent with
those hypotheses. In the statistical analysis, state high court term
length did not prove to be a statistically significant predictor of whether
a state court judge would accept a step-down in the transsystemic
hierarchy of judicial positions in moving to the federal judiciary, as
Hypothesis 6 predicted; the variable, however, did approach
significance at the 10% level. And the data are entirely consistent with
Hypothesis 7's prediction that lateral moves from a state judiciary to
the federal judiciary accompanied by a step-down and a salary
reduction would be rare.
One might object that the data set suffers from problems of
selection bias. First, the data set includes no failed attempts to lateral,
nor does it include failed efforts by (for example) presidents or senators
to induce sitting state judges to lateral to the federal judiciary. The
response to this objection is that the data set includes precisely those
judges who were willing, and able, to make lateral moves. It is
impossible to know whether a failed lateral move was the result of (for
example) insufficient prior judicial experience, prior judicial experience
at an insufficiently high level of the originating judiciary, or some other
reason.
Another objection is that the data set omits judges who were
judges in another judiciary previously, but not immediately prior to the
second judgeship. It is of course possible that a judge successfully joins
a second judicial system because of prior judicial experience in another
system, even if that experience does not immediately precede the second
judgeship. And it is also possible that a judge who joins a second judicial
system directly from another judicial system secured the second
position more because of other experience than the prior judicial
position. Indeed, perhaps that other experience was the reason the
individual successfully obtained positions in both judiciaries. Still, the
definition of lateral that I use here is consistent with the term's use in
other settings. Moreover, the inclusion of judges who worked elsewhere
between judgeships would distance the inquiry from its focus on those
who have chosen judging as a career. Not all those who move directly
from one judgeship to another are career judges, but many are. That
said, in the future, it would be beneficial to extend the analysis to those
whose career paths take them from one judiciary to another, but with
other career stops along the way.

